From the earliest efforts to codify Islamic Law, Muslim scholars explored the methods of evidence and how to identify defects in arguments. They did this in an attempt to prevent individual biases and personal prejudices from influencing their decisions. They recognized that there was a difference between the jurist's personality, biases, and predispositions, on the one hand, and the Islamic ruling as dictated by the principles of Islamic Law, on the other. We can appreciate this distinction by studying the books of Islamic Law in conjunction with the books which were written about the Principles of Law (Usûl a-Fiqh) and the Axioms of the Law (al-Qawâ'id al-Fiqhiyyah). It is the possible to critically analyze the extent to which various rulings conform with the principles of legal interpretation and which reasoned judgments are based upon sound judicial causes.



Islamic legal rulings are derived in a number of different ways, and therefore Muslim jurists sought to codify and precisely define their approaches. One important line of investigation dealt with deriving general rulings that from many subsidiary rulings that already exist in the legal corpus. These are what are known as the general axioms of Islamic Law, and jurists can apply these general rules to soundly and objectively exercise their reasoned judgment when they are confronted with new issues.



Ibn Taymiyah insists that standards of practice in Islamic Law are essential and indispensable. Speaking about juristic analogy (qiyâs), he said that standards "… are the measure of true devotion [to God]. Likewise, we see that the source of deviance from the Law comes from offering analogies – in accordance with their own predilections and tastes – to derive rulings in conflict with the rulings based upon sound evidence." [Risâlah al-`Ubudiyyah]



The development of ordered and systematic approaches to law contributed to protecting Islamic Law from errors that would have crept into the corpus of law due to the varying abilities and intellectual powers possessed by different jurists. Also, since the application and development of Islamic Law took place in a vast territory, spanning different regions and cultures that were remote from one another, standards protected the Law from being confused with local norms and customs. Maintaining the distinction between sacred law and local custom is especially important since custom does indeed play a role in the specific application of certain aspects of the Law in different countries at different times.



Later classical scholars of the various legal schools who reviewed the legal practice of their predecessors were very alert to signs that a jurist departed from the standards of objectivity set forth in the particular school of law and allows personal predilections, tastes, and habits influence legal decisions – sometimes to the extent of arbitrariness. They were quick to criticize a jurist who was unable to differentiate between the dictates of the Law and personal tastes, and they considered this criticism to be necessary to safeguard the sacred law.



We see this critical tendency being employed as early as Imam al-Shâfi`î, the founder of the Shâfi`î school of law. He criticized those jurists who applied a principle of juristic preference (istihsân), when he saw they were using personal tastes and subjective judgments in determining their preferences. He was harsh in his criticizing their tendency to prefer one ruling over another without having a sound evidentiary basis for doing so.



Likewise, the leading jurist Abû Hâmid al-Ghazâlî called such abuses of juristic preferences as being: "confused nonsense", if what is meant by it is a proof that emerges within the jurist's sentiment that he can neither articulate in words or demonstrate as a proof. He said: "This is because what cannot be articulated in words cannot be distinguished from misgivings and pure conjecture. It is essential that the proof is presented openly in order to be recognized as an Islamic legal proof, and so that its soundness can be ascertained."



Islamic Law relies on the authority of the Qur'ân, the Sunnah, and the unanimous consensus (ijmâ`) of the Muslims. These are the three sources of Law that a jurist engages with in deriving Islamic legislation. Throughout the centuries, Islamic Law has been held above the contingencies of different cultures, local customs, and the varying demands of different times. Certainly, these are all factors that a jurist must take into consideration when implementing the Law in a particular time and place. However, such rulings are changeable. They are not immutable and should not be mistaken as such.



This is why the overarching tendency over the centuries has been one of continuous reassessment and pruning of the Islamic legal literature. In the books of law, clear distinctions are often made between those rulings which are constant and those which were developed to address certain contingencies. This is what Hanafî legal scholars mean when they talk about: "the differences of place and time, not differences of evidence." It is the responsibility of a jurist to make it clear which rulings are part of the sacred law and which are extraneous to it.



Over the centuries, and from the earliest times, the Islamic legal literature has demonstrated its tendency to rejuvenate itself by extricating the rulings that were introduced into it from outside. Muslims can be rightly proud of this achievement, and they should strive to continue to approach this field of study in an objective and unbiased manner.
--> Classical Muslim jurists went to great pains to establish the juristic principles of Islamic Law upon to the most rigorous standards. They painstakingly developed the criteria to ensure that when they derived legal rulings from the Qur'ân and Sunnah, they would do so objectively and upon sound reason.

From the earliest efforts to codify Islamic Law, Muslim scholars explored the methods of evidence and how to identify defects in arguments. They did this in an attempt to prevent individual biases and personal prejudices from influencing their decisions. They recognized that there was a difference between the jurist's personality, biases, and predispositions, on the one hand, and the Islamic ruling as dictated by the principles of Islamic Law, on the other. We can appreciate this distinction by studying the books of Islamic Law in conjunction with the books which were written about the Principles of Law (Usûl a-Fiqh) and the Axioms of the Law (al-Qawâ'id al-Fiqhiyyah). It is the possible to critically analyze the extent to which various rulings conform with the principles of legal interpretation and which reasoned judgments are based upon sound judicial causes.

Islamic legal rulings are derived in a number of different ways, and therefore Muslim jurists sought to codify and precisely define their approaches. One important line of investigation dealt with deriving general rulings that from many subsidiary rulings that already exist in the legal corpus. These are what are known as the general axioms of Islamic Law, and jurists can apply these general rules to soundly and objectively exercise their reasoned judgment when they are confronted with new issues.

Ibn Taymiyah insists that standards of practice in Islamic Law are essential and indispensable. Speaking about juristic analogy (qiyâs), he said that standards "… are the measure of true devotion [to God]. Likewise, we see that the source of deviance from the Law comes from offering analogies – in accordance with their own predilections and tastes – to derive rulings in conflict with the rulings based upon sound evidence." [Risâlah al-`Ubudiyyah]

The development of ordered and systematic approaches to law contributed to protecting Islamic Law from errors that would have crept into the corpus of law due to the varying abilities and intellectual powers possessed by different jurists. Also, since the application and development of Islamic Law took place in a vast territory, spanning different regions and cultures that were remote from one another, standards protected the Law from being confused with local norms and customs. Maintaining the distinction between sacred law and local custom is especially important since custom does indeed play a role in the specific application of certain aspects of the Law in different countries at different times.

Later classical scholars of the various legal schools who reviewed the legal practice of their predecessors were very alert to signs that a jurist departed from the standards of objectivity set forth in the particular school of law and allows personal predilections, tastes, and habits influence legal decisions – sometimes to the extent of arbitrariness. They were quick to criticize a jurist who was unable to differentiate between the dictates of the Law and personal tastes, and they considered this criticism to be necessary to safeguard the sacred law.

We see this critical tendency being employed as early as Imam al-Shâfi`î, the founder of the Shâfi`î school of law. He criticized those jurists who applied a principle of juristic preference (istihsân), when he saw they were using personal tastes and subjective judgments in determining their preferences. He was harsh in his criticizing their tendency to prefer one ruling over another without having a sound evidentiary basis for doing so.

Likewise, the leading jurist Abû Hâmid al-Ghazâlî called such abuses of juristic preferences as being: "confused nonsense", if what is meant by it is a proof that emerges within the jurist's sentiment that he can neither articulate in words or demonstrate as a proof. He said: "This is because what cannot be articulated in words cannot be distinguished from misgivings and pure conjecture. It is essential that the proof is presented openly in order to be recognized as an Islamic legal proof, and so that its soundness can be ascertained."

Islamic Law relies on the authority of the Qur'ân, the Sunnah, and the unanimous consensus (ijmâ`) of the Muslims. These are the three sources of Law that a jurist engages with in deriving Islamic legislation. Throughout the centuries, Islamic Law has been held above the contingencies of different cultures, local customs, and the varying demands of different times. Certainly, these are all factors that a jurist must take into consideration when implementing the Law in a particular time and place. However, such rulings are changeable. They are not immutable and should not be mistaken as such.

This is why the overarching tendency over the centuries has been one of continuous reassessment and pruning of the Islamic legal literature. In the books of law, clear distinctions are often made between those rulings which are constant and those which were developed to address certain contingencies. This is what Hanafî legal scholars mean when they talk about: "the differences of place and time, not differences of evidence." It is the responsibility of a jurist to make it clear which rulings are part of the sacred law and which are extraneous to it.

Over the centuries, and from the earliest times, the Islamic legal literature has demonstrated its tendency to rejuvenate itself by extricating the rulings that were introduced into it from outside. Muslims can be rightly proud of this achievement, and they should strive to continue to approach this field of study in an objective and unbiased manner.